2011 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays by unknown
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications
2011-07




























JSOU and  
NDIA SO/LIC Division 
Essays
JSOU Report 11-4 
July 2011
Joint Special Operations University
7701 Tampa Point Boulevard
MacDill AFB FL 33621
https://jsou.socom.mil
Joint Special Operations University 
and the Strategic Studies Department
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 
to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 
operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 
of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 
students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 
leadership. 
JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Opera-
tions Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 
mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 
selected other national and international security decision makers, both 
military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 
science and art of joint special operations. JSOU provides education to the 
men and women of SOF and to those who enable the SOF mission in a joint 
and interagency environment. 
JSOU conducts research through its Strategic Studies Department where 
effort centers upon the USSOCOM and United States SOF missions: 
USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM provides fully capable and enabled 
SOF to defend the nation’s interests in an environment characterized by 
irregular warfare. 
USSOF mission. USSOF conducts special operations to prepare the opera-
tional environment, prevent crisis, and respond with speed, aggression, 
and lethality to achieve tactical through strategic effect. 
The Strategic Studies Department also provides teaching and curriculum 
support to Professional Military Education institutions—the staff colleges and 
war colleges. It advances SOF strategic influence by its interaction in academic, 
interagency, and United States military communities.
The JSOU public Web page is located at https://jsou.socom.mil. 
Joint Special Operations University
Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President
Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D., Strategic Studies Department Director 
Jeffrey W. Nelson, Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.; Juan Alvarez, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.; 
William C. Jones, GS-15, CIA, Ret. — Resident Senior Fellows
Editorial Advisory Board
James F. Powers, Jr. 
Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 
JSOU Senior Fellow
Richard H. Shultz, Jr. 
Ph.D., Political Science
Director, International Security  
Studies Program, The Fletcher School,  
Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow
Stephen Sloan 
Ph.D., Comparative Politics 
University of Central Florida 
and JSOU Senior Fellow
Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 
Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering 
Sandia National Laboratories  
and JSOU Associate Fellow
Joseph S. Stringham 
Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret. 
JSOU Associate Fellow
Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 
Ph.D., History, Courage Services, Inc. 
and JSOU Associate Fellow
Jessica Glicken Turnley 
Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology/ 
Southeast Asian Studies 
Galisteo Consulting Group  




John B. Alexander 
Ph.D., Education, The Apollinaire Group 
and JSOU Senior Fellow
Roby C. Barrett, Ph.D., Middle  
Eastern & South Asian History  
Public Policy Center Middle East Institute 
and JSOU Senior Fellow
Joseph D. Celeski 
Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 
JSOU Senior Fellow
Chuck Cunningham 
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 
Professor of  Strategy, Joint Advanced 
Warfighting School and JSOU Senior Fellow
Thomas H. Henriksen 
Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 
Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow
Russell D. Howard 
Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.
JSOU Senior Fellow
John D. Jogerst 
Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret. 
James Kiras 
Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and 
Space Studies, Air University and JSOU 
Associate Fellow 
William W. Mendel, 
Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.  
JSOU Senior Fellow
Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro 
Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret. 
JSOU Associate Fellow  
On the cover. A U.S. Special Forces team leader greets an Afghan village 
elder in Uruzgan province, Afghanistan, 28 April 2011. Elders from the sur-
rounding area met with U.S. Special Forces personnel to discuss security and 
development in their area. Photo by Private 1st Class Matthew Minkema.  

JSOU Report 11-4 
The JSOU Press 




NDIA SO/LIC Division 
Essays
This report and other JSOU publications can be found at https://jsou.socom.mil. 
Click on Publications. Comments about this publication are invited and should 
be forwarded to Director, Strategic Studies Department, Joint Special Operations 
University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621. 
*******
The JSOU Strategic Studies Department is currently accepting written works relevant 
to special operations for potential publication. For more information please contact 
the JSOU Research Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. Thank you for your 
interest in the JSOU Press. 
*******
This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
 
ISBN 978-1-933749-60-0
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of 
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy 
or position of the United States Government, Department of 
Defense, United States Special Operations Command, or the 
Joint Special Operations University. 
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press
Yemen: A Different Political Paradigm in Context, May 2011, Roby Barrett
Special Operations Forces Interagency Counterterrorism Reference 
Manual, Second Edition, April 2011
Report of Proceedings, 6th Sovereign Challenge Conference (7–10 
November 2010)
The Challenge of Nonterritorial and Virtual Conflicts: Rethinking Coun-
terinsurgency and Counterterrorism, March 2011, Stephen Sloan 
Cross-Cultural Competence and Small Groups: Why SOF are the way 
SOF are, March 2011, Jessica Glicken Turnley
Innovate or Die: Innovation and Technology for Special Operations, 
December 2010, Robert G. Spulak, Jr. 
Terrorist-Insurgent Thinking and Joint Special Operational Planning  
Doctrine and Procedures, September 2010, Laure Paquette 
Report of Proceedings, 5th Annual Sovereign Challenge Conference 
(8–11 March 2010)
Convergence: Special Operations Forces and Civilian Law Enforcement, 
July 2010, John B. Alexander 
Hezbollah: Social Services as a Source of Power, June 2010, James B. Love
USSOCOM Research Topics 2011
2010 JSOU and NDIA SO/LIC Division Essays, May 2010
Afghanistan, Counterinsurgency, and the Indirect Approach, April 2010, 
Thomas H. Henriksen 
U.S. Military Engagement with Mexico: Uneasy Past and Challenging 
Future, March 2010, Graham H. Turbiville, Jr. 
Report of Proceedings, Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) and 
Office of Strategic Services (OSS) Society Symposium, Irregular Warfare 
and the OSS Model (2–4 November 2009) 
Hunter-Killer Teams: Attacking Enemy Safe Havens, January 2010, 
Joseph D. Celeski 
vii
Contents
Foreword  ...............................................................................  ix
Kenneth H. Poole 
Redefining Intelligence Support in a  
Resource Constrained Environment  ........................................ 1
Carrick Longley
Foundations and Adaptation: Transforming Policy into  
Operational Capability for Army Special Operations Forces  ..  13
Ben Taylor
Putting the Fighter Pilot Back in the Air  
Commandos: Why AFSOC Needs a new Skyraider  ............... 25
Dave Jesurun and Grant Sharpe
The Business of Insurgency: Defining the Growth  
of an Insurgency in Terms of Corporate America  ................... 37
Philip S. Townsend
Implementing an Integrated Approach  





The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) partnered with the Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC) Chapter of the National 
Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) in sponsoring the annual chapter 
essay contest. The first-place winner is recognized each year at the NDIA 
SO/LIC Symposium in mid-February and awarded a $1,000 cash prize. The 
runner-up receives $500. 
The competition is open to resident and nonresident students attend-
ing Professional Military Education (PME) institutions and has produced 
outstanding works on special operations issues. These essays provide current 
insights on what our PME students see as priority national security issues 
affecting special operations. 
Essay contestants can choose any topic related to special operations. 
Submissions include hard-hitting and relevant recommendations that many 
Special Operations Forces commanders throughout United States Special 
Operations Command find very useful. Some entries submitted are a synopsis 
of the larger research project required for graduation or an advanced degree, 
while others are written specifically for the essay contest. Regardless of 
approach, these essays add value to the individuals’ professional development, 
provide an outlet for expressing new ideas and points of view, and contribute 
to the special operations community as a whole. 
JSOU is pleased to offer this selection of essays from the 2011 contest. The 
JSOU intent is that this compendium will benefit the reader professionally 
and encourage future PME students to enter the contest. Feedback is welcome, 
and your suggestions will be incorporated into future JSOU reports. 
 Kenneth H. Poole, Ed.D. 
Director, JSOU Strategic Studies Department 
JSOU President Dr. Brian Maher awards first place to Captain Carrick Longley, 
U.S. Marine Corps, for the 2011 National Defense Industrial Association’s  
Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict Chapter (NDIA SO/LIC) Essay 
Contest. Photo courtesy NDIA.
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Redefining Intelligence Support in a 
Resource Constrained Environment
Carrick Longley
The intelligence community must embrace technology and an 
organizational restructuring to provide more accurate, effective, 
and efficient intelligence while reducing its resource footprint. 
With the establishment of permanent intelligence fusion centers 
stateside, reporters, analysts, linguists, and watch officers can focus 
their energy on training a more professional, capable force while 
providing increasingly complex and sophisticated analysis to support 
operators on the ground.
Introduction
The intelligence community (IC) must embrace technology and an orga-nizational restructuring to provide more accurate, effective, and efficient 
intelligence while reducing its resource footprint. The Department of Defense 
(DoD) faces drastic reductions in equipment and manning in the wake of an 
increasingly unstable global economic downturn and must reduce spending 
by nearly $178 billion over the next five years alone.1 Additionally, the recent 
report on intelligence in Afghanistan by Major General Flynn2 is a stark 
reminder the IC isn’t doing enough to provide the right kind of intelligence 
to the warfighter. In order to achieve both a reduction in cost and a refocus 
on providing the right kind of intelligence support, the IC must adopt radical 
new changes to become more effective and efficient while consuming fewer 
resources. These changes include the establishment of consolidated intelli-
gence fusion centers; a reduction in the number of intelligence professionals 
Captain Carrick Longley is a U.S. Marine Corps Intelligence Officer. He submit-
ted this paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School for a Master 
of Science in Information Warfare Systems Engineering and working toward 
completing his Joint Professional Military Education Phase I at the Naval War 
College Distance Education Program. He is currently assigned to the Naval 
Postgraduate School where he is pursuing a Doctorate in Information Sciences.
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deployed to combat zones; and a leveraging of information systems to manage 
intelligence collection, processing, reporting, and analysis. By adopting a 
reachback model wherein consolidated intelligence fusion centers provide 
the majority of intelligence support to forward elements, the IC can improve 
intelligence capability, reduce costs, and accomplish more with less than the 
current model. 
The Intelligence Fusion Center of yesterday and tomorrow
During Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Marine Corps introduced the concept 
of the Tactical Fusion Center (TFC)3 that brought together intelligence profes-
sionals in a variety of disciplines under a single roof to provide the Marine 
Expeditionary Force with all-source intelligence support. While the capabili-
ties of the TFC were far reaching, the logistics support required to maintain 
this large footprint was not a small undertaking. Both the Marine Radio 
and Intelligence battalions deployed with hundreds of individuals required 
to support their efforts — many of whom were not intelligence professionals 
themselves. Electronic maintenance, communications, logistics, administra-
tion, and motor transportation were among the many supporting elements 
required to support the needs of the TFC to function overseas. A majority of 
these individuals consumed information and material resources to support 
their efforts as well. Resource constraints and bandwidth limitations in for-
ward outposts are often severely strained due to the large amount of nones-
sential and routine traffic pushed over the networks. Reducing the number 
of individuals using these networks in bandwidth-constrained environments 
and transferring this demand to continental United States (CONUS) networks 
can significantly reduce the information bottlenecks that occur today. Addi-
tionally, a reduction in numbers of individuals deployed will also lead to a 
reduction in costs. Once these forces are reduced at the forward presence, they 
can continue to provide support while operating in combined intelligence 
fusion centers. Rather than deploy linguists, analysts, report writers, and 
watch officers, with the logistics burden that accompanies them, to a large 
outpost in a forward environment, these same individuals will now work in 
permanent intelligence fusion centers providing the same level of intelligence 
processing, analysis, and dissemination stateside. 
Intelligence units require a high amount of connectivity and access to 
network resources to accomplish their mission. Information is often collected 
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and transmitted using various networks and the reporting processes; tracking 
and sharing are all done using these same networks. With the capabilities 
of these information systems, physical proximity means less now than it has 
before. An interconnected network of networks has replaced the limitations 
once posed by line-of-site communication systems. Relying on a constella-
tion of satellite and terrestrial communications systems, analysts located 
in the United States can watch real-time video of intelligence, surveillance, 
and reconnaissance platforms and receive field reports as they are collected. 
This information can in turn be processed, analyzed, and disseminated to 
operators in the field in a matter of minutes. With this ability to transfer 
information quickly from the point of capture to an analyst and back, the 
need to deploy thousands of individuals to a combat zone occupying large 
outposts is unnecessary. 
Many problems such as occupational proficiency, strained family life, and 
lack of training affect intelligence support. Nearly every one of these problems 
can be attributed to the high deployment rates for soldiers, sailors, Marines, 
and airmen. While the majority of the operating forces experience much 
higher deployment to home station ratios, the intelligence occupational fields 
(at least in the Marine Corps) often experience ratios close to 1:1.4 In other 
words, personnel are deployed as often as they are home, causing enormous 
strain on family life for these individuals. In addition to strained personal 
lives, units have difficulty providing their individuals with adequate training 
given the limited number of days spent in CONUS. Linguists whose language 
proficiency is other than those spoken in target area of operations (AOR) have 
experienced difficulties with promotion due to their inability to work on their 
target languages given the deployment cycle. Basic intelligence analysts are 
often not well prepared to conduct meaningful analysis and often resort to 
the sports, news, and weather presentations that merely discuss events and 
offer opinions as to why these events occurred with little empirical support 
for their arguments. If we can reduce the number of these individuals that 
must deploy, it is logical to presume that our ability to train these individu-
als and retain the quality needed to solve complex problems will improve. 
Our intelligence professionals can focus on their target environments in the 
course of their daily work, and occupational proficiency will increase. The 
removal of the predeployment training process will reduce the number of 
hours devoted to non-intelligence-focused activities. In other words, our 
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intelligence professionals will spend more time doing intelligence work and 
less time focusing on nonessential work. 
Analytic support from Monterey to Kandahar
In order to demonstrate that this model is not merely theoretical, the following 
section will discuss the implementation of an information collection tool used 
by Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) teams in Afghanistan during the 
fall of 2010 and the support provided by the Common Operational Research 
Environment (CORE) lab at NPS in Monterey, California. By using an inex-
pensive, unclassified, open-source 
information system developed at the 
NPS, the lab demonstrated the ability 
to support complex, tactical opera-
tions in remote villages thousands of 
miles away to include sociocultural 
analysis support to forward operators using free and open-source technology. 
From August to November 2010, the Field Information Support Tool (FIST) 
was employed in Afghanistan in support of the Village Stability Platform. 
FIST was used as a means to expose operators to a more comprehensive 
analytic methodology for analyzing the complex, sociocultural environment 
in Afghanistan and demonstrate the capabilities of technology developed at 
the NPS. During this prototype employment of FIST, the Village Stability 
Operations (VSO) teams collected hundreds of unique reports, conducted 
analysis on a variety of metrics, and produced a number of analytical products 
focused on the sociocultural landscape in southern Afghanistan. In addition 
to their own organic collection and analysis, the teams used a web-based 
information repository to share their data. The combined dataset included 
over 421 unique collection reports containing several hundred individuals, 
organizations, locations, and relational ties embedded therein. These reports 
were obtained using a framework specifically developed and tailored for the 
VSO mission in which the collection of relational information on business, 
kinship, organizational, personal, and tribal affiliations — in addition to 
obtaining standard demographic data — formed the preponderance of data 
collection. 
Once the VSO data was collected, the CORE lab analyzed the dataset 
using geospatial, temporal, and social network analysis in order to provide 
… the lab demonstrated the ability 
to support complex, tactical oper-
ations in remote villages thousands 
of miles away …
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a coherent, logical, and useful analytic product based on empirical data 
while working in a laboratory in California. This analysis yielded results 
that confirmed the understanding of the operational environment forward, 
but also provided unique insights not previously discovered by the units on 
the ground. The following section details how this analysis was conducted 
to demonstrate the ability to conduct reachback analysis and build products 
to support even small, tactical level units. 
The analysis of the Khakrez district begins by taking a look at the district 
geospatially (see Figure 1) and then focusing on some of the high level obser-
vations that can be made about the data collected in the area. During the 
collection, interviewers recorded the location of the interview and asked 
about the location of each individual’s home and place of work. By recording 
these locations geospatially, we can use tools such as Google Fusion Tables to 
quickly display the resident’s location on satellite imagery in Khakrez. 
Figure 1. The Khakrez District of Kandahar province, Afghanistan. Source: 
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After becoming oriented geospatially with the location of the district 
and the individuals interviewed (Figure 2), we continue to focus on general 
demographics in the area. Figure 3 shows the breakdown of the occupations of 
the individuals in the district as a percentage of the total interviews. This pie 
chart was built using the occupation data field collected from the VSO teams.
Figure 3. Occupation breakdown of Khakrez District 
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Of note, more than one-third of the population held agricultural jobs, 
suggesting that any efforts focused on agrarian matters would be of interest to 
a significant majority of the district. From general demographic breakdown, 
we continue to look at the organizational structure of the district as seen in 
Figure 4. The dark gray nodes correspond to individuals and the X-blocks 
are organizations. While there are other organizations in Khakrez, isolates 
(nodes with no ties to the network) and dyads were removed to clean up the 
visualization.
From the organizational sociogram, we focus more specifically on the 
tribal affiliation network in Khakrez. Figure 5 is the tribal affiliation socio-
gram and Figure 6 shows the breakdown of the dataset in terms of tribes in 
the area with individuals once again being represented by gray circles and 
tribes by X-block squares. 
Figure 4. Khakrez District Organizations Sociogram (Circles represent indi-
viduals and x-blocks represent organizations.)
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Figure 5. Tribal Affiliation Network in Khakrez 
Figure 6. Tribal Composition in the Khakrez District
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Now that we have looked at the Khakrez dataset with broad-brush strokes, 
we focus more specifically on the common linkages between the two dominant 
tribes: the Popolzai and Alikozai. 
The four individuals highlighted in Figure 7 (made anonymous for pur-
poses of this discussion) could prove useful, as they represent the ties common 
between both tribes in the area (from the data collected). These individuals 
serve as bridges between the two tribes that could serve as a means of improv-
ing communication or cooperation between the groups. Conversely, focusing 
on the same persons and reducing or eliminating their individual ties with 
each group could completely sever ties between the groups. As the purpose 
of the VSO is to improve the security and livelihood in the area, the former 
is practice of interest.
After focusing on the organi-
zational level data, we turned our 
attention to the individual level 
networks and analyzed a combi-
nation of personal, kinship, and 
business ties. For this network, 
isolates and pendant nodes were 
recursively hidden that yielded 
the sociogram seen in Figure 8. 
Figure 7. Common Linkages 
between Tribes
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Interestingly, the procedures performed during the analysis brought to 
light the same network of Agent 106 and his role in the Khakrez District. The 
VSO team identified and focused their analysis on Agent 106 based on the 
identification from the detachment commander in Khakrez. In the analysis, 
the VSO team identified the same individual based on his unique position 
between two Mullahs and position in the network. Being able to identify key 
individuals like Agent 106 without prior knowledge of the village is critical 
in understanding and developing various strategies and lines of operation. 
The above analysis demonstrates that it is not only feasible to conduct reach 
back analytic support, but it also demonstrates that insights normally thought 
to only be available at the forward edge can be observed from thousands of 
miles away with no prior knowledge of the operating environment. 
Conclusion
Technology that can aid in transforming how we provide intelligence sup-
port from the strategic to the tactical level is readily available; in fact, a large 
amount of it is free to use. The ability to transfer large amounts of information 
throughout the operating environment enables the IC to adopt a new construct 
wherein support is provided remotely with greater consistency at a reduction 
in cost. By standing up permanent intelligence fusion centers stateside, the 
ability to conduct long-term intelligence support will not be jeopardized by a 
decreasing budget and reduction of force structure. Soldiers, sailors, Marines, 
and airmen can spend more time at home, improve occupational proficiency, 
and continue to provide the support needed for the long war ahead. Rather 
than exhaust our limited supply of highly specialized individuals over the 
next decade, we should instead focus on how we can maximize the output 
and quality of support while minimizing risk. 
Endnotes
 1. Gopal Ratnam, “Gates Proposes Troop Cuts, $78 Billion Budget Decrease” Bloom-
berg Businessweek, Jan. 6, 2011 (http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-01-06/
gates-proposes-troop-cuts-78-billion-budget-decrease.html).
 2. Major General Michael T. Flynn, Captain Matt Pottinger, Paul D. Batchelor, Fixing 
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intelligence-operations-anbar). 
 4. Hope Hodge, “Marines look to improve deployment-to-dwell ratios.” Jdnews, Apr. 
30, 2010 (http://www.jdnews.com/articles/ratios-77803-increase-amid.html). 
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Foundations and Adaptation: Transform-
ing Policy into Operational Capability for 
Army Special Operations Forces
Ben Taylor
Current and future security environments will require the U.S. to 
have versatile forces able to operate throughout the spectrum of 
conflict. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) were created 
to provide this versatility. In order to have the strategic impact for 
which ARSOF was created, these forces must be remissioned from 
the tactical tasks that currently consume their availability, returned 
to their core competencies, and their bureaucratic structure adapted 
to maximize their strategic potential. This change will occur in a time 
of limited budgets and within the constant struggle of parochialism 
within and among the services. Through the Phase 0 operations 
for which ARSOF was tailored, they will provide the capability to 
maintain the U.S. as a global power. 
A rapidly changing world deals ruthlessly with organizations that do 
not change and USSOCOM is no exception. Guided by a comprehen-
sive enduring vision and supporting goals, we must constantly reshape 
ourselves to remain relevant and useful members of the joint team. 
 — General Peter J. Schoomaker, U.S. Army1
History informs our present and provides insight to our future, and the future appears bright for U.S. Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). 
Throughout ARSOF’s history, the roles and missions of Civil Affairs (CA), 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and Special Forces (SF) 
Major Ben Taylor is a U.S. Army Special Forces officer. He submitted this 
paper while attending the Naval Postgraduate School, where he is currently 
studying to earn his Master of Science in Defense Analysis. He would like to 
thank Lieutenant Colonel Michael Richardson, Military Faculty, NPS, for his 
help in editing the paper.
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have expanded and contracted dependent upon the political climate and the 
security environment. This paper proposes that these ARSOF units should 
return to their core competencies in order to meet the present threat, while 
the future security environment will demand these same capabilities under 
a different organizational structure. A growing body of literature from the 
military and academia suggests future U.S. conflicts will trend toward irregu-
lar and unconventional threats, so the capabilities of Army Special Opera-
tions Forces seem destined for prominence in the Department of Defense. 
However, as General Schoomaker suggests in the quote above, ARSOF is not 
immune to the need to transform to remain relevant. ARSOF leaders must 
quickly translate current policy into tangible operational capability, while 
simultaneously keeping an eye on the future. This innovation must take 
place over the next two decades, in a time of continuing conflict, budgetary 
restrictions, and a globalizing international system. If transformed properly, 
ARSOF will provide national leaders with a unique range of capabilities in 
defense, diplomacy, and development which are suited to the threats of the 
future. This paper uses the term ARSOF to refer specifically to Army Civil 
Affairs, Military Information Support Operations, and Special Forces for the 
sake of brevity, realizing that Army Special Operations Forces also include 
other units such as Army Rangers and Special Operations Aviation.2 
ARSOF Beginnings 
The current units that comprise the U.S. Army Special Operations Forces 
originated in World War II. Civil Affairs units were first established early in 
the war to bridge the military-political gap found when governing occupied 
countries.3 The larger Army was uncomfortable with this idea, as governance 
was not perceived as a military function. Immediately following V-E Day, 
President Truman announced that civil administration of occupied territories 
would transfer from the War Department to the State Department. There was 
a consensus that this was the right course of action, but the State Department 
lacked the resources to effectively administer the areas. So, despite concur-
rence on the ideal situation, the War Department continued to conduct civil-
ian administration.4 This case proved to be a harbinger of things to come.
Psychological Operations had an equally rocky beginning in World War II, 
with psychological warfare capabilities shuffled from the Army to the Office 
of Strategic Services (OSS) and back again. Psychological activities were seen 
by military leadership as dishonorable and inherently “unmilitary.” 5 Although 
15
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used extensively in World War II, military leadership was quick to disband 
psychological warfare capabilities following the war’s conclusion. Fortunately, 
then-President Eisenhower recognized the value of psychological operations 
from his experience as the Allied Commander and sponsored its reestablish-
ment as an effective tool in the fight against Communism.6
As with psychological operations, the confluence of the existential threat 
of Communism and the power of an influential sponsor, explains the estab-
lishment of Special Forces. A former OSS member, Aaron Bank, saw the need 
for a military unit that could, “develop, support; organize, train, or exploit 
indigenous guerilla” 7 forces within enemy territory. Originally, created within 
the Psychological Warfare Center at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, Special 
Forces units were staffed by former OSS members and European émigrés.8
In the years since the creation of Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations 
(now MISO), and Special Forces, these specialized units have seen a constant 
cycle of growth and contraction in size, missions, and acceptance within the 
Army. The number of personnel and level of prominence within the military 
seem to be indirectly proportional to the number of missions ARSOF claims 
to be able to conduct at any period of time. During the conflict in Vietnam, 
when Special Forces was at the zenith of its personnel strength, SF units 
conducted indirect by, with, and through operations and clandestine strikes, 
while their General Purpose Force (GPF) counterparts conducted exten-
sive advisory missions with the South Vietnamese Army. In the years after 
Vietnam, ARSOF was drawn down in size and argued for a broader range of 
missions, until the operations in Somalia. During the late 1990s, another era 
of grasping for a concrete role, ARSOF again expanded its mission set, until it 
was called to complete the purpose for which it was created in Afghanistan.9 
Throughout its history, ARSOF is in a continuing struggle for acceptance in 
the Army. At other times, ARSOF is its own worst enemy, as it deviates from 
its core competencies in search of tasks to remain relevant. 
The last nine years of conflict have 
seen ARSOF reduced to tactical support 
of GPF in contrast to having the strategic 
impact for which it was organized, trained, 
and equipped. For example, Army Special 
Forces, after leading the classic unconventional warfare overthrow of the 
Taliban regime, transitioned to a direct-action tactical method in support 
of GPF. Civil Affairs units working either with Provincial Reconstruction 
The last nine years of conflict 
have seen ARSOF reduced to 
tactical support of GPF …
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Teams, or independently, are finding themselves — as they did in post-WWII 
Europe — trying to hand over governance and stability operations to U.S. 
government agencies that do not have the capacity to conduct them. Mili-
tary Information Support Operators are enmeshed in supporting the GPF 
population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign. While there are key 
supporting roles that ARSOF should fill in Iraq and Afghanistan — training 
of Afghan commandos and Iraqi counterterrorist forces, as well as MISO in 
support of COIN — there is an opportunity cost associated with the large 
amount of ARSOF personnel that these missions currently occupy. That cost 
is felt in places where ARSOF should, and would traditionally, be conducting 
the operations for which they were formed. The following analysis uses the 
above history, coupled with the scope provided by ARSOF capstone documents 
and national security policy statements, to propose a roadmap for immediate 
and long-term change. 
The Near Future (5–10 Years)
In its recent history of expanding and contracting core missions and roles, 
ARSOF has done itself a disservice in not firmly establishing its roles and 
limitations. However, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan may provide 
an excellent backdrop for the reestablishment of these standards. The last 
seven years of both conflicts have shown the utility of ARSOF support to 
GPF operations. With the GPF-supporting role of ARSOF displayed, now 
is the time to reestablish ARSOF’s independent role in achieving strategic 
goals — the unconventional warfare and influence missions for which ARSOF 
was created. What makes ARSOF uniquely suited to conduct these missions 
is the training and organization of the personnel that includes regional spe-
cialization and language ability. Ironically though, there currently exists a 
contradiction between the renewed ARSOF focus on language capability and 
its deployment of forces. For instance, 3rd Special Forces Group retains the 
primary responsibility for operations in Afghanistan, and the accompany-
ing Theater Security Cooperation Plan training missions in the former soviet 
republics. Yet, the personnel assigned to 3rd Special Forces Group are trained 
in French and Arabic languages, for use in Africa. Meanwhile, 1st Battalion, 
10th Special Forces Group, with its core of Russian language-trained soldiers, 
is headquartered near U.S. Africa Command, and therefore is conducting 
training missions in Africa. Although ARSOF purports to be refocusing on 
language capability, it is deploying French and Arabic-trained operators to 
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Russian-speaking countries, and Russian-trained operators to Africa. An 
immediate realignment of forces to their traditional AORs would truly place 
priority on language and regional specialty. In addition, forces gained by the 
drawdown dividend — ARSOF personnel that are able to be repurposed from 
the current conflicts and applied towards more strategic goals — must refocus 
training and mindsets to the long-term view inherent in strategic operations 
in support of national policy. This refocus must take place in the context of 
national and military political realities: current national security policy and 
military infighting over roles and functions, and future budgetary constraints. 
The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) helps define the U.S. defense 
strategy for the near-term future. The QDR lists strategic priorities in the 
following order: prevail in today’s wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare 
to defeat adversaries and succeed in a wide range of contingencies, and 
preserve and enhance the all-volunteer force.10 ARSOF units have a role in 
all of these priorities, but particularly in the prevent and deter conflict role. 
As the prevail in today’s wars priority begins to decline, one can assume a 
comparable decline in ARSOF requirements. The ARSOF units freed from this 
priority can reassume their intended roles in Phase 0 operations — namely, 
preventing the next decisive engagement by building the capacity of our allies 
and disrupting, defeating, and deterring current and future enemies. These 
operations will take place in regions of political and social unrest that affect 
the interests of the U.S. and our allies. This renewed focus on Phase 0 opera-
tions will take the form of increased bilateral military exchanges in support 
of the Theater Security Cooperation Plans as well as MISO and CA support 
to country teams’ long-range development plans. 
An additional factor affecting the need for ARSOF to adapt is the shrink-
ing of the capability gap between SOF units and GPF units who are becoming 
more SOF-like. Many transformations in GPF have allowed them to take on 
missions usually considered the exclusive domain of ARSOF, and ARSOF must 
redefine its capabilities to remain relevant.11 GPF units are currently involved 
in the training of both Iraqi and Afghan Army units — the type of foreign 
internal defense (FID) operation that once was the exclusive domain of Army 
SF. In addition, as GPF commanders have realized the power of information 
operations, the use of tactics to influence popular perceptions have become a 
component of all military operations — no longer the sole purview of psycho-
logical operations specialists. Instead of trying to protect ARSOF’s role as the 
primary capability in FID and influence operations, leaders should define the 
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strategic and politically-sensitive operations which ARSOF is uniquely suited 
to conduct and use the GPF capabilities to compliment them at the tactical 
and operational levels. The GPF have a history of advisory and stabilization 
experience — from post-World War II, through Korea, to Vietnam — and the 
future security environment will provide enough work in developing nations 
to occupy the full range of U.S. military capabilities. 
Military innovation and adaptation does not occur in a vacuum, and the 
current fiscal situation in the U.S. means that ARSOF decision makers must 
argue every recommendation in budgetary terms. President Dwight Eisen-
hower once said, “the patriot today is the fellow who can do the job with less 
money.” 12 ARSOF leaders must be 
these patriots. Fortunately, budget-
ary constraints are an area where 
ARSOF has a strong argument for 
prominence and growth. Personnel 
costs are the largest portion of the 
DoD budget,13 and SOF units are inherently smaller organizations than GPF. 
Although the development and sustainment costs for an individual ARSOF 
soldier is higher than for a GPF soldier, the comparative personnel numbers of 
ARSOF units are lower. Also, training and equipping is only a small portion 
of personnel cost; the largest portion is in healthcare and retirement — areas 
where there is no distinction between ARSOF and GPF individuals. In addi-
tion, the ARSOF focus on exceptionally enabled individuals and units, which 
places priority on training the human platform over purchasing expensive 
technological platforms,14 will yield a greater return on investment than equip-
ment that has a finite life cycle. Finally, in the personnel vein, ARSOF has seen 
rapid growth in the last four years, especially in the indirect action forces of SF, 
CA, and MISO. These personnel increases are already allocated and paid for, 
so the cost associated with their repurposing is minimal compared to having 
to create military structure. The argument for force structure in the future 
becomes one of capabilities as compared to cost, as Defense Secretary Gates 
notes, “an effective, affordable, and sustainable U.S. defense posture requires 
a broad portfolio of military capabilities.” 15 Therefore, in a future defined by 
maintaining the maximum capability at the lowest cost, ARSOF presents deci-
sion makers with a great return on their investment — high-capacity forces 
with low personnel numbers that are, by design, capable of strategic impact. 
Fortunately, budgetary constraints 
are an area where ARSOF has a 
strong argument for prominence 
and growth. 
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The Distant Future (15+ Years)
Although it is difficult to forecast the future security environment, some 
effort at prediction is necessary in order to prevent any major bureaucracy 
from becoming irrelevant. Using the military axiom that intelligence drives 
operations, this paper uses the Global Trends 2025 document, produced by 
the National Intelligence Council and the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, as a “crystal ball.” Several of the predictions made in the Global 
Trends report have significant impact on the military, and specifically ARSOF. 
China and India will continue to rise in power, along with non-state actors 
such as businesses, religious organizations, and super-powered individuals, 
resulting in a redefined international system. Additionally, the increasing 
diffusion of technology will make terrorists groups and rogue states more 
dangerous as they potentially acquire and use weapons of mass destruction.16 
The overall tone of the Global Trends report, as well as the writings of other 
military and diplomatic strategists, suggests that a confrontation with the rising 
powers of China or India is unlikely, but that the U.S. will remain engaged 
in regional conflicts in developing parts of the world, and under threat from 
terrorist organizations. 17 These strategic predictions place priority on forces 
that are able to operate independently in developing nations, with indigenous 
counterparts, in order to build their capacity to handle their own problems. 
This is the very mission set for which ARSOF was created. 
The future security environment will be rife with continuing regional 
conflicts as traditional societies in the developing world collide with the effects 
of globalization. When the U.S. is no longer the dominant global power, the 
nation will no longer have the latitude to conduct unilateral conventional 
military operations in regional conflicts. Military intervention will either take 
the form of coalition operations with regional and/or other global powers, or 
will require small-scale operations. As language and culturally trained and 
attuned soldiers, operating in small autonomous units, ARSOF is uniquely 
suited for both coalition and small-scale operations in developing nations. In 
addition, the diffusing technologies associated with weapons of mass destruc-
tion will place preeminence on not only surgical, counterproliferation direct 
action capabilities, but also on a global human intelligence network that can 
stop these technologies from getting into the wrong hands. The threats of the 
future validate the need for capabilities ARSOF currently possesses. However, 
most of these threats call for an architecture that places priority on indirect 
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operations — operating by, with, and through local security forces — over the 
direct action missions, which currently occupy a majority of SOF structure 
and budget. Therefore, this paper proposes the following top-down changes 
to meet this future threat. 
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) should be 
divided into two directorates; the indirect action and direct action director-
ates. In the foreseeable future, Army 
SF, CA, and MISO, could feasibly join 
with the forces of Marine Special 
Operations Command (MARSOC), 
to form the core of the USSOCOM 
indirect action (IA) directorate.18 This 
directorate would be separate from the direct action capabilities, such as Army 
Rangers, Navy SEALs, and special mission direct action units. The transfor-
mation to joint doctrine and training in the IA directorate would shift this 
organization toward the global scouts program. This program would place 
SOF operators — often individuals or small teams — in key developing coun-
tries where there are U.S. interests. Personnel would retain their functional 
specialty and become experts in the area to which they are assigned. IA teams 
would assist the country team and the intelligence community by providing 
ground-level human intelligence. This capability is not currently the focus of 
either Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or defense attaché personnel assigned 
to embassies. Furthermore, the IA directorate should strengthen ties with 
both the CIA and Department of State to nest its operations in the country 
plans of State and the requirements of the intelligence community. Addition-
ally, the IA directorate would need an innovative personnel management 
system, mirroring the specialization of Foreign Service Officers and CIA Case 
Officers. In this way, IA personnel truly become the global scouts that they 
claim; providing not only ground-level human intelligence, but also strategic 
reconnaissance for future unconventional warfare (UW) and FID operations.
In conjunction with the creation of the IA directorate, Army Special Forces 
should remove direct action from its core tasks. Direct action operations are 
performed to a higher capability by other SOF units and to an acceptable 
capacity by most U.S. military ground forces — they are not what make Special 
Forces special. Instead, the ability to conduct unconventional warfare — the 
guerilla warfare, sabotage, and subversion involved in supporting an insur-
gency against an enemy government — is what makes Special Forces unique. 
The United States Special Opera-
tions Command should be divided 
into … indirect action and direct 
action directorates.
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While FID is often considered “the other side of UW,” it should remain a 
secondary task for Army SF. Marine Special Operations are uniquely suited, 
and have a culture better attuned to conducting FID. This should remain the 
primary mission of MARSOC. Army Civil Affairs and Military Information 
Support Operations should continue to do their core missions, but with a 
radical shift in timing — from picking up the pieces in the aftermath of large 
conventional campaigns to conducting operations in support of Phase 0, long 
before conflict occurs.
Some will argue that the separation of USSOCOM into direct and indirect 
directorates will further stovepipe an already divided organization. While 
there is merit to the argument that both direct and indirect actions should 
be intertwined, the functional stovepipes already exist within the current 
organizational structure. Formalization of this de facto split has more advan-
tages than disadvantages. This split will refocus ARSOF on its core tasks, 
and prevents the trend of SF focusing too heavily on direct action missions, 
and CA and MISO focusing at the tactical level of operations only. Finally, 
the formation of directorates creates the synergistic effect of grouping units 
with similar focus, so that doctrine and training can be aligned to truly 
move toward joint operations — whether direct or indirect in nature. In this 
proposal, USSOCOM facilitates the interagency cooperation so integral to 
both direct and indirect operations. 
Army Special Operations Forces are at a unique point in their history. They 
currently occupy a position of distinction within the military that they have 
not previously enjoyed. While some may argue that this is a period to just 
enjoy the new-found acceptance of ARSOF, this would be a missed opportu-
nity. In a future security environment defined by a globalizing international 
system, diffusion of dangerous technologies, constrained budgets, and general 
purpose forces closing the capability gap with ARSOF, this is precisely the 
time to develop a long-range plan for ARSOF transformation. Change begins 
with the drawdown of ARSOF in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the repurpos-
ing of these forces to their traditional roles — conducting Phase 0 operations 
worldwide. However, the future security environment demands more than 
a return to the basics — it will demand ARSOF units that are adaptable, flex-
ible, and always on the cutting edge of technological and doctrinal changes. 
In order to fully maximize their capability and facilitate the strategic impact 
for which ARSOF was created, the bureaucratic structure above ARSOF 
units must be drastically reshaped. If this return to core competencies and 
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adaptation of organizational structure is done properly, ARSOF will prove 
that successful prosecution of indirect action can prevent the need for direct 
action and large-scale conflicts. 
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Air Commandos: Why AFSOC Needs  
a new Skyraider
Dave Jesurun and Grant Sharpe
Air Force Special Operations Command’s Air Commando history 
includes the adaptation of a variety of aircraft, a great many of 
which were fixed-wing, forward-firing attack aircraft such as the 
A-1E Skyraider. AFSOC no longer employs fighter-type aircraft 
like the A-1, relying instead upon a rapidly aging fleet of AC-130s 
to provide close air support (CAS) to ground SOF units. Unfortu-
nately, this “one size fits all” approach cedes the responsibility for 
daytime SOF CAS to the conventional Air Force. This need not be 
the case. AFSOC could handle both night and daytime SOF CAS 
requirements if it diversified its fleet and included a single-engine, 
propeller-driven observation/attack aircraft such as the Embraer 
A-29 Super Tucano.
In World War II, Air Commando units in the Pacific (forefathers of today’s Air Force Special Operations Command) included three types of attack 
aircraft: P-47s, P-51s, and B-25s. In Vietnam, Air Commando units operated 
nine types of observation and attack aircraft, including the O-1, O-2, OV-10, 
A-26, A-37, AC-47, AC-119, AC-130 and the A-1E Skyraider. Today, AFSOC 
has only one attack aircraft: the AC-130. The AC-130 is a superb weapon 
Major Dave Jesurun and Major Grant Sharpe are both U.S. Air Force officers, 
AC-130 instructor pilots and weapons officers. They co-wrote this paper while 
attending the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, where they 
both pursued an M.S. in Defense Analysis. Major Jesurun is currently assigned 
to the Special Operations Command Europe at Ramstein Air Base, Germany. 
Major Sharpe is currently assigned to SOCPAC at Camp Smith, Hawaii. 
 This essay was derived from a chapter in the thesis entitled, “The New 
Skyraider: How light attack aircraft can optimize the Air Force’s irregular 
warfare capability.” Majors Jesurun and Sharpe co-authored that work as well. 
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system, but it is not perfect and it cannot be everywhere, all the time, doing 
everything. The combined effects of age and two wars are taking their toll 
and are wearing out the fleet. However, it is the conventional Air Force’s Air 
Combat Command (ACC) — not AFSOC — that in 2008 proposed a forward-
firing, light attack aircraft (OA-X) as a low-cost solution to the challenges 
of the irregular warfare CAS problem.1 Unlike ACC’s other new acquisition 
programs such as the F-22 and F-35, these aircraft would not be “high tech” 
fifth generation fighters using stealth, speed, or overwhelming firepower to 
defeat peer or near-peer competitors. Instead, the OA-X would be a slower, 
fit-for-purpose aircraft — like the A-1 Skyraider — designed specifically for 
the rigorous ground attack and recce demands of irregular warfare (IW). As 
any visit to the Hurlburt Field airpark will readily demonstrate, AFSOC’s Air 
Commando heritage includes the innovative use of a wide variety of light 
attack aircraft just like this. Embracing this heritage by standing up its own 
OA-X squadrons will not only redress current gunship deficiencies but also 
ensure AFSOC meets its future CAS obligations to Special Operations Forces 
(SOF) ground units. 
Air Commando light attack history: From Burma to Vietnam
The history of light attack aircraft in support of SOF dates back to WWII 
and the genesis of special operations aviation itself. Faced with the daunting 
task of attacking a numerically far superior Japanese force in the jungles of 
Burma, British Army Colonel Orde C. Wingate conceived of a classic spe-
cial operations raiding campaign using “hit-and-run tactics, carried out by 
Long-Range Penetration (LRP) groups deep behind enemy lines.” 2 Author 
Philip Chinnery explains how Wingate’s circumstances in 1942 necessitated 
the birth of the Air Commandos.
… the Japanese communication and supply lines to the interior were 
vulnerable and susceptible to harassment by highly mobile troops 
moving through the cover of the jungle. For obvious reason the LRP 
groups would need to be supplied by air and, as they were lightly 
armed, they would need to rely on aerial firepower in lieu of artillery.3
When American allies joined Wingate’s operation in 1943, they brought 
with them the airpower which Wingate’s troops had originally lacked in 
their earlier efforts. This included C-47s and gliders for transport, but also 
P-51A Mustangs and eventually even B-25H Mitchell bombers, for “close air 
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support.” 4 The importance of synchronizing ground and air action in the 
execution of special operations was obviously not lost on Colonel Wingate. In 
fact, when his “exploits were reported in the press, and his men were given the 
name of Chindits,” Wingate thought that this “mythological beast, half lion 
and half griffin … symbolized … the unique cooperation required between 
ground and air forces.” 5
This special operations light attack tradition continued decades later in 
Vietnam. In one of the most daring special operations of the war, a group 
of Special Forces (SF) raiders successfully assaulted a North Vietnamese 
prison camp at Son Tay. Because lightly armed helicopters carried the force 
to and from their objective, five Air Commando A-1E Skyraiders provided 
escort, protecting them along their route of flight. Extensive joint premission 
rehearsals in the United States greatly enhanced their ability to do so effec-
tively. Retired Son Tay raider Command Sergeant Major (CSM) Joe Lupyak 
commented in 2009 that rehearsing with the same aircrews with whom he 
would later execute his mission, “made all the difference in the world.” 6 This 
training included “day and night live fire rehearsals [and] close air control of 
the A-1s.” 7 During the mission and while the raiders were on the objective, 
A-1 pilots relied on the familiarity gained from joint training and provided 
suppressive fire along “the approaches to the camp.” 8
One of the best examples of air-ground coordination between SOF units 
and light attack aircrew in Vietnam actually comes from Army aviation rather 
than from Air Commandos. Numerous SF camps operated throughout the 
Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during the war. According to Mr. John Lewis, 
USASOC contractor and retired Army O-1 pilot, “in RVN (1968–1969) … at 
least 75 SF camps … had a runway of some sort and all were supported by 
an O-1 (Birddog) from an Army Aviation Recon Airplane Company. Many 
camps had one or more O-1s living at the camp and more than 100 Birddogs 
supported SF and MACVSOG at that time.” 9 The benefit of having aviators 
live and operate out of the same base as the supported troops was undeniable. 
Pilots learned local patterns of life and became “integral to support of the 
unit.” 10 Apparently, the enemy knew this too, growing to fear the artillery 
or air attack response which an O-1 could coordinate. As a result, troops in 
contact (TIC) events involving convoys escorted by O-1’s became very rare.11
The current that runs through these examples is the concept of organic 
CAS — airborne fire support that is dedicated to the supported ground force. 
This is not a new assumption for SOF however. From its inception straight 
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through to today, SOF has benefited from the primacy of this assumption. 
For a current social proof, one need look no further than AFSOC. AFSOC 
has AC-130s which, in current practice, are obligated primarily to SOF and 
only secondarily to general purpose forces (GPF) if no SOF tasking exists on a 
given night. The AH-6 Little Birds and MH-60 Defensive Armed Penetrators 
of the 160th SOAR provide USASOC’s example of the widespread acceptance of 
the concept that SOF ought to have the benefit of owning its own fire support 
assets. Similarly, as former OV-10 pilot Kit Lavell notes in his book Flying Black 
Ponies, the Navy employed the Broncos of VAL-4 to provide dedicated CAS 
to Navy SEAL and river patrol units operating throughout the Mekong Delta. 
AC-130 deficiencies
Given the common acceptance of the concept of SOF-organic CAS, it is unfor-
tunate then that AFSOC cannot provide enough of it. The problem is that 
the venerable AC-130 cannot do the job alone. Despite having the right low 
yield weapons for IW CAS, the AC-130 is too expensive and too vulnerable 
for more extensive use. The AC-130 is simply not designed to fly in the day-
time, where its sheer size and predictable firing orbit make it an easy target 
for man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS, i.e. SA-7, SA-14, etc) and 
antiaircraft artillery.12 
Its loss would be expensive both in terms of personnel and materiel. An 
AC-130 performs CAS using a crew of 13 and an aircraft that costs as much 
as $190 million.13 Worst of all, it will not be long before some AC-130s must 
abandon even the night battles they have come to dominate. The AC-130H is a 
1969 vintage airframe, slated to begin retirement in 2012.14 The AC-130U, a 1989 
vintage aircraft, is wearing out its original issue wingboxes. Fleet wide depot-
level maintenance to replace them is ongoing The AC-130J is “programmed” 16 
as a replacement for the AC-130H but is not expected to be ready until 2017.17 
AFSOC and U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) are pursuing 
gunship modifications to their MC-130Ws as a “stop-gap” measure until then 
but these will suffer from some of the same deficiencies as the current fleet. 
Being C-130s, the Combat Spear aircraft will also be tactically unsuited to 
providing CAS in the daytime.
OA-X and its advantages
Precision firepower. Fortunately, the OA-X provides a viable alternative. 
Like an AC-130, which has some of the shortest “danger close” distances 
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of any CAS aircraft, the OA-X will also be able to accurately engage targets 
which are in very close proximity to friendlies. Also like the AC-130, the 
OA-X will have guns. However, if the tactical situation requires greater fire-
power or stand-off than a .50 caliber machine gun can provide, OA-X crews 
can employ larger weapons. Despite their bigger “punch” and in contrast to 
most of the gunship weapons suite, these weapons will be precision-guided 
and will include the AGM-114 Hellfire II missile and laser-guided bombs up 
to 500 pounds (GBU-12).18 
Survivability. By contrast, the OA-X would be more survivable primarily 
because it is smaller and harder for the enemy to visually acquire. The size dif-
ference between an AC-130 and even the largest OA-X candidate is significant. 
At 59 feet, the wingspan of the AT-802U Air Tractor is only slightly larger 
than that of the A-10 (57 feet, 6 inches). The AC-130 is more than twice as big 
with a wingspan of more than 132 feet. This difference in size is essential to 
the OA-X’s daytime advantage over the gunship. Additionally, because the 
OA-X would be a more conventional, forward-firing platform, it need not orbit 
a target to engage it, a tactic which makes the gunship predictable — and in 
the daytime, extremely vulnerable. Also, unlike a gunship, the OA-X would 
have only one engine and consequently only one potential heat source for 
IR-guided MANPADS versus the AC-130’s four engines. 
Cost. The OA-X would also be considerably more efficient than an AC-130. 
While an AC-130 requires 13 crewmembers to perform its mission, an OA-X 
can provide CAS with only 2 crewmembers — a pilot and a backseater: a 
weapon systems officer (WSO), a supported unit’s fire support officer (FSO), 
or even a foreign national. For more intensive missions, two OA-Xs might be 
required but 4 crewmembers are still considerably fewer than the ODA-size 
crew of the gunship. Besides being manpower efficient, the OA-X would also 
be cost efficient. While a new AC-130J will cost approximately $200 million,19 
an OA-X aircraft costs only $10 million.20 At these prices, the cost of a single 
AC-130J could finance 20 OA-Xs. 
Acquisitions are not the only cost consideration, however. Operating cost 
is a factor as well, and this comparison also favors the OA-X. For example, 
in FY2010 an AC-130H cost DoD $8,906.23 per hour to operate, exclusive of 
the cost of fuel.21 High estimates for OA-X operating costs are only $1500 
per hour.22 Finally, OA-X may have a lower opportunity cost than additional 
AC-130s. While new AC-130Js are programmed to be ready in 2017, there are 
30
2011 Special Operations Essays
models of OA-X aircraft available right now from existing production lines. 
The Embraer A-29 Super Tucano for example is already in service with the air 
forces of Brazil and Colombia. Diversifying its CAS portfolio, by adding OA-X 
aircraft now, reduces the risk that AC-130J production delays will jeopardize 
AFSOC’s planned improvement in overall CAS capability.23 
Forward basing and “nomadic” CAS 
Unlike the AC-130 which gives up the inherent short/austere field capabil-
ity of the original C-130 design in order to support the added weight of its 
guns, sensors, avionics, ammunition, and fuel, OA-X aircraft would retain 
their ability to operate from short and/or unimproved airfields.24 The AT-6B 
for example has already demonstrated dirt-strip capability on the Nevada 
Test and Training Range during JEFX 10 and could potentially be fitted with 
modified wheels and landing gear to provide an even more robust rough 
field capability.25 
This is not insignificant. In Afghanistan and other irregular war zones, 
this capability would open up many more forward operating bases (FOBs) as 
potential hosts. Just as the Reconnaissance Airplane Companies in Vietnam 
co-located with the ODAs they supported, so too could AFSOC OA-Xs move 
forward. This arrangement would generate two advantages. First, SOF units 
could brief and debrief with the same aircrews who supported them, helping 
build trust and rapport. Second, reaction times to TICs would be reduced since 
aircraft would not have to travel from distant airbases with large runways. 
Like the original Air Commandos who operated from strips freshly hewn 
from the Burmese jungle, future OA-X Air Commandos will also be able to 
operate anytime, anywhere. Since OA-X aircraft will be capable of operating 
from semi-prepared fields such as grass, gravel and dirt, this would allow 
OA-X aircrews to co-locate even with small, rapidly moving ground parties. 
Operating from dirt roads or even completely unprepared surfaces, these 
CAS nomads, would be unconstrained by the logistical requirements that 
currently tether the AFSOC AC-130 fleet to large bases. 
The logical extension of this concept would be the acquisition and employ-
ment of an aircraft that follows in the rough tracks of the O-1 Birddog. With a 
single engine, a conventional landing gear configuration (i.e. tail wheel), and 
oversized bush tires, a light 2-seat aircraft can easily operate from strips less 
than 500 feet in length. As part of the study from which this essay is derived, 
the authors explored this concept in detail while completing an Alaskan bush 
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flying course in August 2010, operating from landing zones. A number of 
commercially available aircraft observed or discussed on that trip could serve 
as the starting point for a fully off-airport capable CAS aircraft. These include 
the Sherpa K-650T and the Cub Crafters Carbon Cub, a highly modified, 
modern version of the legendary PA-18 Super Cub bush plane. Freed from the 
burdens of pavement, a modern Birddog would go even further afield than a 
modern Skyraider and allow nomadic CAS pilots to brief and plan with SOF 
who may be operating far from any established FOB.
Escort
Package escort is a mission that would be the exclusive domain of the OA-X 
since no aircraft in the AFSOC fleet is optimally suited to the task. Author 
Orr Kelly astutely noted in 1996 that “[a]nother gap is evident on the park-
ing aprons at Hurlburt. There are no fixed-wing escorts to fill the role of the 
[A-1] Spads of the Vietnam era or the P-51s of the World War II battles in 
Burma.” 26 That situation has not changed in the intervening 15 years, as the 
parking ramps at Hurlburt, Mildenhall, Kadena, and Cannon will attest. 
The escort potential of an OA-X aircraft could restore substantial capability 
to a SOF infiltration. Now, an air package, such as the one which delivered 
the Son Tay raiders, could enjoy the same organic defensive capability that 
an ODA would have at an FOB equipped with OA-Xs — the same capability 
the Son Tay raiders had when there were still A-1s in the Air Commando 
inventory. Furthermore, this organic defensive escort may allow ground SOF 
units to complete infiltrations with better OPSEC and a lower profile since 
all of the required air assets would be available in house. There would be no 
complicated clearance issues reading in members from the conventional Air 
Force. Also, regional suspicion and/or offense would be kept to a minimum 
since high-profile fighter aircraft such as F-16s or A-10s could be left at home. 
This would completely avoid the thorny diplomatic issue of overflight clear-
ances for these combat aircraft. Finally, were deception necessary, an OA-X 
aircraft could easily be painted to resemble a training aircraft. 
Critics of the OA-X as an escort platform might point out that an MC-130 
has considerably longer range than a small light attack aircraft. However, 
all of the OA-X candidate aircraft have sufficient fuel to fly for at least four 
hours, unrefueled. Furthermore, these light attack aircraft could be modi-
fied with a refueling probe, just as the A-37 was. This probe would allow the 
aircraft to receive fuel from any tanker which uses a drogue-style fuel delivery 
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system — tankers such as the MC-130H, MC-130P, and MC-130W, all of which 
are already in AFSOC’s inventory.
Employing the OA-X like a gunship
Other critics of light attack aircraft may claim that gunships still possess 
greater utility than light attack aircraft because of their unique capabilities. 
However, technology has advanced considerably since the early days of gun-
ship development; and as technology has advanced, what was once technically 
unique about the gunship is now commonplace in military aviation. With 
the notable exception of the side-firing guns, many aircraft possess gunship-
like capabilities such as advanced avionics, sensors (i.e. advanced targeting 
pods like SNIPER) and weapons. The OA-X will have a number of capabili-
ties that compare favorably to the gunship: long loiter time, multiple radios, 
and datalinks.27 What distinguishes the gunship from other platforms then 
is its crew and their training. Their relentless dedication to the singular task 
of night precision CAS sets gunship crews apart. As distinctive as this gun-
ship aircrew culture is, however, like the AC-130 technology that enables it, 
this too can be replicated.
Recreating the gunship attitude in a new airframe requires adapting 
gunship techniques to different equipment. To start with, an initial cadre of 
AFSOC OA-X crews should include gunship crew members. Who better to 
instill the culture of precision CAS than those who already live it? This cadre 
would of course include both pilots and combat systems officers (CSOs, i.e. 
navigators and fire control officers). These future backseaters would enable the 
essential 2-man crew concept for AFSOC OA-Xs. Because SOF missions tend 
to be very communications-intensive operations, the extra set of ears would 
be as indispensable as the extra set of eyes for conventional surface attack. 
Additionally, having a gunship cadre would allow for the easy importation of 
gunship tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). The HAVE ACE program, 
which trains and familiarizes SOF ground personnel with AFSOC aircraft, 
would be a great venue for showcasing these TTPs. Doing so would serve to 
build SOF ground unit confidence in the new aircraft the same way that it 
has helped do so for the gunship.
One of the most important sets of TTPs to be imported would be those 
related to convoy escort, a task which gunship crews perform exceptionally 
well.28 The key to this performance is situational awareness of both the friendly 
convoy and its immediate surroundings. With its two visual sensors, a single 
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gunship can continuously track the friendlies while simultaneously scanning 
ahead and behind for oncoming threats. With this information, the gunship 
navigator then issues detailed directions to the convoy to guide it through 
unfamiliar areas. These directions are invaluable to SOF teams on the ground 
in foreign countries with cities which may not even have street signs.
A two-ship flight of OA-X aircraft could also accomplish this task in 
a similar manner. Since each OA-X will possess its own EO/IR sensor,29 a 
two-ship flight of these aircraft will essentially have the same sensor suite 
as a gunship.30 And just as on a gunship, one sensor will remain padlocked 
on the friendlies, while the other sensor scans the road ahead, behind, and 
to the side for threats. The CSO tracking the friendlies will issue the turn 
commands while the CSO on the other aircraft can pass threat warnings. 
For added situational awareness, the two crews could even view each other’s 
sensor feeds via ROVER.31 
Summary
With all of its light attack aircraft long since retired, AFSOC has essentially 
put all of its eggs in the AC-130 basket. This C-130-only approach to CAS 
is inconsistent with both AFSOC’s Air Commando history and its future. 
Although fighter pilots are now something of an anomaly in AFSOC, this 
was not always the case. In fact, the great-grandfathers of AFSOC, the first 
commanders of the 1st Air Commando Group were both fighter pilots. Lt. 
Col. Philip Cochran flew P-40s in North Africa and Lt. Col. John Alison flew 
them with the Flying Tigers in China.32 AFSOC should supplement its AC-130 
fleet with a squadron of fighter-type OA-X aircraft for SOF fire support. These 
modern day Skyraiders would restore the capabilities lost with the retirement 
of the original, overcome the deficiencies of the AC-130, and substantially 
enhance AFSOC’s ability to meet its fire support obligations to its SOF ground 
brethren, especially in daylight. Put simply, the OA-X will enable AFSOC to 
once again provide CAS in accordance with its motto: anytime, anywhere. 
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The Business of Insurgency: Defining 
the Growth of an Insurgency in Terms 
of Corporate America 
Philip S. Townsend
While much has been written on insurgencies, an adequate defini-
tion for the growth process of insurgencies has not been published. 
This paper defines the growth process of an insurgency in terms 
associated with a business or organization model, examining the 
aspects of recruitment, indoctrination, energy and time consump-
tion, as correlations between outcomes of geopolitical insurgencies 
and organizational insurgencies. 
The struggle between an insurgency and the state is a battle to dominate the political space within the nation. As an insurgency grows in size 
and capability, the state applies pressure against the insurgency and, at times, 
the general populace to diminish and ultimately eliminate the threat of the 
insurgency. While the state is trying to maintain its position of authority by 
applying pressure on the insurgency, the insurgency is trying to grow in terms 
of membership and resources. For an insurgency to survive, grow, and achieve 
victory over the state, it must evolve, adapt, and embrace an organizational 
structure that enables the insurgency to maximize efficient energy consump-
tion, while withstanding the pressure applied by the state. The challenge for 
insurgent leaders is to determine the most efficient processes for capturing the 
political space through operational and tactical level operations, maximizing 
the effects of successful operations while minimizing the effects of failures. 
Understanding this, the question then becomes, “How does an insurgency 
grow?” What factors influence the growth and success of an insurgency? 
Is the growth of an insurgency a calculated, deliberate process, carefully 
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orchestrated by the leaders, or merely a collection of unrelated, coincidental 
events and decisions made by a group of individuals with no real thought 
to organizational goals or potential outcomes? To be successful, insurgent 
leaders must carefully manage all of the resources available, including the 
individual members of the insurgency, or else the insurgency will face the 
threat of collapse. 
Assuming the growth of an insurgency is a process, what model can best 
describe the process? Leites and Wolf illustrate the insurgency as a system in 
which endogenous and exogenous elements provide inputs which are converted 
into outputs which then become endogenous inputs or turn to engage the 
authority.1 While this system successfully simplifies the insurgency into four 
basic components, it does not provide an inclusive definition for the insur-
gency process. The Webster’s College Dictionary defines the word process as 
“a systematic series of actions directed to some end.” 2 The Leites and Wolf 
system fails to incorporate a key component of the insurgency process, the end, 
and while the Webster’s definition gives an allusion to an end-state or goal, it 
does not clearly define the variables that influence insurgency growth. It fails 
to address the existence of internal and external variables that influence the 
actions taken by the insurgency leaders. If the Leites and Wolf model and the 
Webster’s definition are insufficient for clearly defining the growth process 
of an insurgency, then a better definition is required. Utilizing Lawless and 
Bergman’s quantum theory, Choucri’s System Dynamics Model for State 
Stability, and illustrations of social movement within organizations, a business 
model definition of the word “process” proves to provide a solid foundation 
for defining and ordering the characteristics of the growth of an insurgency. 
BusinessDictionary.com defines the term “process” as a “sequence of interde-
pendent and linked procedures which, at every stage, consume one or more 
resources (employee time, energy, machines, money) to convert inputs (data, 
material, parts, etc.) into outputs. These outputs then serve as inputs for the 
next stage until a known goal or end result is reached.” 3 The subject of outputs 
and inputs has been discussed extensively, so for this paper inputs are defined 
as people or recruits, food, and materials, and outputs are those activities 
conducted by the insurgency against the state.4 This leaves the remainder of 
the definition for further examination, starting with the procedures. 
Defining a process as a sequence of procedures follows closely with the 
Webster’s definition. The actions of a process follow an order that, if managed 
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sufficiently, lead to the desired outcome. Ford’s assembly line for the Model T is 
a classic example of a sequence of procedures that led to the desired outcome. 
Prior to adding the engine and the transmission to the frame of the automo-
bile, workers had to build the frame and prepare it to receive the engine and 
the transmission; however, the frame did not sit on the assembly line while 
the team assembled the engine and the transmission. All three components 
were fabricated and assembled simultaneously to maximize efficiency. There 
are numerous actions that occur in the early stages of an organization and 
in an insurgency, and these actions are interdependent and linked. Three 
significant actions are recruiting efforts, information management, and 
deception operations. 
Recruiting is the process of persuading or coercing an individual to join 
a team or an organization. In their 2006 article, “A Quantum Metric for 
Organizational Performance: Terrorism and Counterterrorism,” Lawless and 
Bergman state, “The goal [of a terrorist group or insurgency is] to increase 
the number of supporters in the target organization, either by persuasion of 
greater benefits in the case of the modern organizations, or, when intellectual 
arguments fall short, by intimidation with threats to their very survival …” 5 
The initial goal of an insurgency is to grow. An insurgency of one is not going 
to effect the change desired and overthrow a government. The first hurdle for 
an insurgency is the problem of how to grow, but to solve this problem, the 
insurgency must identify its target audience. Choucri et al. developed a system 
dynamics model (SDM) for analyzing state stability,6 in which they organized 
the people of a state into three primary categories: the general population, 
dissidents, and insurgents.7 This model defines dissidents as members of the 
population who are anti-regime and peaceful, while insurgents are anti-regime 
and violent. Assuming the SDM is correct, the goal of insurgency recruiting is 
to convince the dissidents to become insurgents and to increase the dissonance 
within the general population, causing more to become dissidents. Figure 1 
illustrates the flow from the general population to dissident to insurgent. While 
this segment of the model shows the flow of recruits through the process, it 
does not incorporate the insurgency’s information management operations 
that are occurring simultaneously. 
Information management is addressed later in this paper as the mechanism 
for converting inputs to outputs, but in this section, managing information 
involves the signaling by the insurgency to the target population that the 
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state authority is waning. The SDM continues to build on the above model, 
claiming that in the midst of, and in fact supporting, the recruiting process, 
the dissident and insurgent populations continue conducting operations 
that undermine the legitimacy of the regime, such as formal and informal 
messages, protests, and targeted attacks.9 As the state reacts to these incidents, 
the insurgents manipulate the messages generated by the state’s reaction to 
create doubt in the minds of the general population as to the capacity of the 
state. This, combined with an effective recruiting program, may sway more 
dissidents to join the insurgency and increase the dissonance in the general 
population.10 While increased dissonance amongst the general population and 
the increased numbers of potential recruits may seem like a positive gain for 
the insurgents, this remains a critical and precarious time. In order to recruit 
new members and stage incidents that capture the attention of the general 
population, the insurgents must expose themselves, providing a target for the 
state. This can be devastating, if not fatal, to the movement if the state can 
capitalize on the exposure and capture or kill insurgent leaders. Therefore, 
insurgent leaders must also conduct a deliberate deception plan to protect 
themselves and the movement. 
Lawless and Bergman stated that “terrorists form regular groups [,] but 
ones with extreme beliefs, because their intents, if known would be rejected 
by society [;] they can only operate in unfriendly territory by hiding their 
intents [in order] to focus and time their destabilizing effects.” 11 The insurgents’ 
deception plan targets the populace and the state. The insurgents must deceive 
the populace to protect their true intentions and the state to protect their 
existence. As insurgents conduct operations against the state, these operations 
raise tension in the overall system. This tension “leads to an awareness of its 
source, [but] maximum deception occurs when deceivers act cooperatively 
to minimize disagreement with opponents, effectively remaining unseen by 
Figure 1. Adapted from Ways to Affect the Population-to-Insurgent Flow Model 8
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reducing emotional responses to their presence and politics.” 12 To survive, the 
insurgents must recognize that if their true intentions are revealed before the 
level of dissonance in the population is high, they risk having the populace 
reject their recruiting efforts.13 
While this is a very brief examination of this portion of the definition, the 
intent is to show the complexity of the interdependence and enmeshment of 
the sequence of events or procedures are in the growth of an insurgency, not 
to provide an exhaustive analysis of the three topics. The next portion of the 
definition to examine is the consumption of resources.
The resources of an organization, whether it is a modern corporation or 
an insurgency, are those elements that are consumed during the process. 
Some of the more obvious resources are the basics: food, water, money and 
hardware. However, there are two resources that are often overlooked or taken 
for granted: energy and time. Returning to the Ford analogy, the purpose of 
the assembly line was to maximize the number of automobiles produced in 
relation to the amount of time required to produce an automobile. By train-
ing and organizing the workers in accordance with their assigned positions 
on the assembly line, Mr. Ford was able to harness their collective energy, 
which led to the production of more automobiles in a smaller amount of 
time. As Lawless and Bergman state, “[the] purpose of an organization is to 
find collective sources of energy (E) for the benefit of its members. By work-
ing as a team, more complex solutions can be attempted, forming a strategy, 
algorithm or business model.” 14 In the beginning, the number of insurgents 
is small, requiring the insurgents consume or exert higher levels of energy to 
conduct operations. However, as the membership grows, the collective energy 
of the insurgency grows meaning a smaller amount of energy is consumed at 
the individual level during operations. 
The resource of time has an interesting effect on energy consumption. For 
an insurgency, the perception of time fluctuates based on the size of the insur-
gency. While the state perceives the insurgency threat as low, the insurgency 
has more time to grow and expand. Inversely, the higher the perceived threat 
to the state, the more pressure the state will put on the insurgency, meaning 
less time for the insurgency to grow and expand. As the insurgency’s perceived 
time for growth and expansion shrinks, its willingness to expend and consume 
higher levels of energy at lower levels of efficiency will grow unbounded, 
leading to more risky behavior. During times of high energy consumption at 
low efficiency rates, insurgent leaders are vulnerable to making catastrophic 
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mistakes that, if exploited by the state, can decimate the insurgency. When an 
insurgency is declining or the insurgents perceive it to be ending, they will be 
more willing to consider tactics that were previously rejected: suicide bombing, 
large-scale conventional battles with the state, and terrorist acts against the 
populace, like in Al Fallujah in 2004, where al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) attempted 
to regain the support of the populace forcibly through a terror campaign.15 
This critical error by AQI exacerbated the division between the organization 
and the general populace, leading to the creation of the Anbar Awakening.16 
Resource consumption is a reality; every organization consumes resources, 
from the individual consuming his lunch to corporations like Ford, Southwest 
Airlines, and Microsoft consuming fuel and raw materials. The successful 
organizations are those that can consume resources most efficiently, which 
leads to the question, “How does an organization become more efficient 
in its consumption?” How does an organization or an insurgency become 
more efficient at converting its resources into a finished product? Efficiency 
is increased through training and education, also known as indoctrination. 
Reiterating the interdependence of the process, every action taken by the 
insurgency influences the decision-making process of potential recruits. By 
manipulating the information in the recruits’ environment, the insurgency 
controls what messages potential recruits receive, limiting their perceptions 
of possible alternatives, making joining the insurgency appear the only viable 
option for security and survival. Once the decision is made, the indoctrina-
tion begins in earnest. The importance of this indoctrination cannot be 
overestimated. One purpose of the insurgency growth process is to create a 
controllable, effective insurgent, willing to do whatever the insurgent leader 
asks. Krause points out that “insurgencies by their very nature are fractious 
affairs, and the stress and discord generated by decisions at strategic junctures 
can bring to the fore internal disagreements or variances over the direction 
that the insurgency is moving.” 17 BusinessDictionary.com defines the term 
“process control” as the “activities involved in ensuring a process is predictable, 
stable, and consistently operating at the target level of performance with only 
normal variation.” 18 Gray and Ariss illustrate that ideologies or visions form 
the basis for consensus and when those ideologies are accepted, agreement 
about mission, strategy, and tactics is relatively easy to achieve and maintain.19 
However, if the ideology is not widely accepted, conflict will arise between 
those of competing motivations.20 Olson argues that during times of rapid 
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economic growth, populations shift geographically to meet the new demands, 
but the new settlements experience social upheaval because “the social group-
ings that bind people … have not had time to develop.” 21 In an insurgency, 
social grouping derives largely from the quality of the indoctrination. If the 
insurgency grows faster than the cadre can indoctrinate new recruits, the 
organization must decide to either dilute the message or limit the number 
of recruits it is willing to accept. If the insurgent leaders choose the former 
and dilute the message or vision, the potential for dysfunctional terror and 
lapses in security 22 grows rapidly as new recruits are shuffled through the 
indoctrination process too quickly. If the insurgent leaders choose the latter 
and limit their recruiting efforts, they face the danger of exposure to state 
forces by disillusioned, spurned former recruits. 
Both decisions pose significant challenges to the insurgent leaders as they 
try to strike a balance between growth and efficiency. Once that balance is 
achieved and the insurgency is gaining momentum, what happens next? 
What is the next step in the evolution of the insurgency? After the definition 
addresses the conversion of inputs to outputs, it states that the outputs from 
the previous stage serve as the inputs for the next stage, a concept that the 
Leites and Wolf system supports. Without ascribing to the Army doctrine 
that insurgencies can be tracked through distinct phases, an insurgency does 
evolve over time. As an insurgency grows, and the process converts inputs 
into outputs while consuming resources in order to grow and counter the 
state’s pressure, the system of the insurgency evolves. 
The final portion of the definition to examine is the known goal or end 
result. Once the insurgency has successfully grown to the point of being 
capable of defeating the state’s forces, having forced the state beyond its 
operational limits, the insurgents must now focus on establishing themselves 
as the dominant authority in control of the political space, the new state. 
“[Osama] bin Laden, like the Mafia and others who forcibly gain cooperation 
from a people to achieve the ends, fail once in power. They cannot rise above 
the laws of physics to generate nor to adapt to new [situations]; they can only 
use the tool that brought them to power: subjugation.” 23 If the ultimate goal 
is to defeat the state, and the insurgency is successful, the insurgent leaders 
must be prepared to become the very being they spent so much time, energy 
and resources to defeat. Insurgencies fail for any number of reasons: the lead-
ers commit strategic mistakes, inexperienced insurgents expose themselves 
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to the state and are captured, and sometimes the state pressure proves too 
formidable and the insurgency fails before it ever gets started. Sometimes the 
insurgency does win. 
Zald and Berger point out four possible outcomes for insurgencies in 
corporate organizations: Failure and repression, Segmental Operation, Enclave 
Support and Total Incorporation.24 Failure and repression easily provide the 
most recognizable correlation between the models of an insurgency within 
a state and an insurgency within an organization. For the organization, they 
mean the suppression and disbanding of the insurgency through expulsion 
or punishment; two examples are police officers and priests, who may be 
exiled to undesirable positions.25 For an insurgency, they most likely mean 
execution or jail. One interesting similarity is that authorities in the corpo-
rate organization must also consider the impact of the punishment on the 
rest of the organization. Overreaction may work to discredit the corporate 
authorities, a fact also seen in America’s use of long-range missile strikes.26 
It is difficult to argue that segmental operation is a potential result of an 
insurgency against a state. In the corporate organization, this occurs as the 
insurgency is maintained over a long period of time without any formal guid-
ance from the leaders; this is most common in diverse organizations with 
multiple lines of interest.27 
While the definition of enclave support closely parallels external support 
for an insurgency, the corporate application of the term has a special nuance. 
Enclave support of an insurgency in a corporate organization occurs when 
external pressures coerce the authorities to recognize and tolerate the insur-
gency.28 While it is certainly feasible that one state could coerce another state 
to tolerate an insurgency, it is not as common and would likely invoke an 
international condemnation. 
In the corporate setting, a total incorporation means that, over time, if the 
insurgents’ product proves to be viable and supportive of the corporate goals, 
the organization may adopt the insurgents’ perspectives and the insurgents 
themselves may be promoted.29 Zald and Berger provide the creation of the 
armed helicopter and the doctrine of mobile infantry as an example of total 
incorporation of an insurgency.30 In the national setting, it is possible to see 
insurgencies incorporated into the fabric of the state, like in the negotiated 
peace in Nepal. In 2006, the competing political parties in Nepal united to 
peacefully end the Hindu monarchy and elect a democratic government.31 
While the situation in Nepal is far from stable and further from democracy, 
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negotiated peace settlements do occasionally happen, allowing both the 
insurgents and the states to survive. 
While it would be reckless to suggest that the study of corporate business 
models can provide an accurate tool for predicting the growth of an insur-
gency, there are enough significant similarities between a corporate organi-
zation, state and an insurgency to utilize corporate business models to assist 
in thinking strategically about how to understand and defeat an insurgency. 
The business definition of a process illuminates the interdependence of the 
procedures within the growth process, and by gaining a clear understanding of 
the definition presented and the terms it contains, a clearer understanding of 
the growth of an insurgency can be gained. In no way is this list of definitions, 
correlations, and analogies exhaustive. Each of these subjects can and should 
be explored and tested further to ensure the most succinct understanding is 
achieved. The number of possible tracks of study on the inputs and the outputs 
of an insurgency is overwhelming and requires significantly more time and 
effort for a thorough examination. The Quantum Theory and the System 
Dynamics Model offer enormous potential for understanding the complex-
ity of insurgencies and terrorist groups; linking the theory and the model to 
organizational life cycles has the potential to create common understanding 
of the greatest external threats our nation faces today.
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Implementing an Integrated Approach 
to Train SOF for the FID Mission
Ken Watson
SOF Irregular Warfare capabilities are in critical high demand and 
must be bolstered to ensure sufficient capacity for future interagency 
efforts. A new dual track approach is in order that will increase 
specialization between direct and nondirect organization and 
training while bridging the interagency collaboration gap. Grow-
ing regional experts through targeted and extended tours, while 
embedding SOF teams with the country mission is a potential tool 
that could be utilized in this endeavor. 
Special operations training attempts to find and develop within individu-
als an extraordinary inner strength and an ability to think and innovate. 
At the same time, training emphasizes the sanctity and necessity of 
small teams, the unit that undertakes most operations. Only through 
belief in the team and trust among its members will special operators 
be successful 1 — Susan L. Marquis
United States Special Operations Forces (SOF) are a hallmark capabil-ity supporting our national interests at home and abroad. They have 
provided solutions to some of the wickedest problems we face in attempting 
to foster a more stabile and secure world environment, capable of adeptly 
blending aspects of both hard and soft power. Yet, the security environment 
today continues to evolve and challenge our abilities to respond with greater 
diversity and flexibility. The comparatively simple strategies based upon a 
bipolar world dominated by Cold War superpowers have been replaced by an 
increasingly complex and unpredictable global security quandary in which 
Mr. Ken Watson is a Department of the Air Force civilian logistician. He sub-
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we must now use a fully integrated whole-of-government approach. Engaged 
in battle in Southwest Asia since the early 90s, we are at a turning point in 
our strategy for defense for the coming century as we can no longer afford, 
both in cost of lives and treasure, to continue largely unilateral and hard 
power-centric operations around the world while maintaining the economic 
strength that has enabled our military capabilities. The recent Quadrennial 
Defense Review states thus in the opening executive summary:
The United States faces a complex and uncertain security landscape 
in which the pace of change continues to accelerate. The distribu-
tion of global political, economic, and military power is becoming 
more diffuse.2
Clearly we must adapt our methods and strategies for defense against new 
threats to our national security in entirely new ways in order to maintain our 
position as a primary world power. SOF Irregular Warfare capabilities in the 
areas of Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) are 
at the forefront of the capabilities that we must project effectively in potential 
trouble spots in weak and failing states. Effective operations to deal with these 
new threats will require a whole new set of training rubrics, tools, and wide 
range of options, relying much more on non military-specific solutions and 
close interaction and integration with host-nation governments, intergovern-
mental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). In the 
following pages I will discuss one approach for facilitating the education and 
training of SOF operators with the skill sets necessary to succeed in this new 
environment and make recommendations for implementation. This approach 
seeks to maintain the “sanctity” and effectiveness of the small 12-man team, 
but adds more specialization to delineate between hard and soft capabilities 
while preserving the ability to think and innovate as part of a more diverse 
organizational team. 
The most recent National Security Strategy of the United States makes it 
clear that stabilization operations are now at the forefront of our ability to 
deter violence and prevent conflict around the globe. 
Where governments are incapable of meeting their citizens’ basic 
needs and fulfilling their responsibilities to provide security within 
their borders, the consequences are often global and may directly 
threaten the American people. To advance our common security, 
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we must address the underlying political and economic deficits that 
foster instability, enable radicalization and extremism, and ultimately 
undermine the ability of governments to manage threats within their 
borders and to be our partners in addressing common challenges.3
Additionally, all elements of our national power — diplomacy, informa-
tion, military, and economic (DIME) — must be brought to bear in order to 
address the security and stabilization of weak and failing states. The key to 
taking fullest advantage of these capabilities is to ensure we use all elements of 
power in concert with one another. This requires close integration between all 
of the players involved, most notably Department of State (DoS), Department 
of Defense (DoD), and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). 
As stated in the Joint Operating Concept for Irregular Warfare, “To prevent, 
deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, the joint force must seek to work 
in concert with other governmental agencies and multinational partners, 
and, where appropriate, the host nation to understand the situation in depth, 
plan and act in concert, and continually assess and adapt their approach in 
response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem.” 4 There is an 
acute need for intermeshed civil military collaboration and cooperation in 
new and innovative ways, yet disparities persist. The USAID Civil-Military 
Program Operations Guide states, “One of the recurring frustrations on the 
part of USAID is that many key USAID offices have no equivalent in the DoD 
universe. There is no DoD program office, no monitoring and evaluation 
office (although there is a center for lessons learned). There is no DoD-USAID 
cooperation policy, in part because USAID is viewed as one of many civilian 
entities with which the Defense Department cooperates.” 5 We must develop 
new organizational constructs that will serve to bridge this apparent collabo-
ration gap, especially with regards to the major U.S. government stakeholders 
in FID and SFA; a teaming approach that will bring the interagency together 
towards a common U.S. national-level objective. 
Furthermore, while a whole-of-government approach is essential as stated 
above, it is equally important that the objective be clearly aligned for all 
players. What is the objective of FID, and how does it differ from SFA? FID is 
defined as “Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in 
any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated 
organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insur-
gency terrorism, and other threats to its security.” 6 Similarly, SFA is defined as 
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“activities that contribute to unified action by the U.S. Government to support 
the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and 
their supporting institutions.” 7 Although closely aligned, the two terms are 
distinguished apart by the threat itself. Whereas FID is exclusive to internal 
security threats, SFA is concerned with both internal and external. Both 
missions require working by, with, and through the host-nation governments 
whom we seek to support. This of course requires a level of cultural aware-
ness, language capabilities, and deep understanding of the complex societal 
intricacies on a new level for our operators. While USSOCOM is addressing 
these new education requirements for its personnel, there are other additional 
steps that can and should be taken to improve the effectiveness even more. 
While the added language and cultural education is certainly required, time 
on the ground provides a much greater depth of understanding and long-
term benefits. For the sake of simplicity, I’ll term that new level of cultural 
awareness, and even cultural acceptance, as a native capability. 
“Going native” has long been used as a negative term for personnel, mili-
tary or otherwise under some other official employment capacity, who have 
in the performance of their duties in some foreign land become assimilated 
into the local culture. While not always the case, this typically corresponds 
to an apparent dereliction of duty with regards to their original purpose for 
being in the foreign area in the first place. This brings to mind the crew of 
HMS Bounty and most notably her First Officer, Mr. Christian. Although, 
stereotypical perceptions aside, there is a higher degree of operational environ-
ment knowledge, as well as local legitimacy that can only be gained by time 
and being embedded with the people of the country we seek to assist. These 
are crucial factors to be able to swiftly react to dynamic, unstructured, and 
unforeseen situations. This is the difference between knowing enough of a 
language to be able to speak it, and speaking it daily with natives so that even 
local dialects become apparent. There is no substitute for time in this regard. 
Additionally, the kinds of close relationships that can and should be fostered 
in support of FID actions in general, are garnered through the levels of trust 
that come with long-standing personal relationships. This is the same concept 
that has led to the current Joint Staff sponsored AFPAK Hands program, 
whereby working relationships are stabilized through utilization of the same 
U.S. personnel on regular rotations. A derivative of this personnel manage-
ment policy would provide the SOF community with an additional tool on 
either a country, or perhaps regional, basis to put experts in place for longer 
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periods of time. In this case we would encourage and even reward our trained 
security experts to be “native.” Operationally this would require a uniquely 
different make-up of the 12-person SOF team. This proposed soldier-diplomat 
team would have a non-kinetic focus and composition that was specific to 
the stability of an assigned country or region. 
The integrity of the direct action teams and the incredible amounts of 
specialized training and education involved with their development must 
be preserved. It represents trademark clandestine capabilities that are in 
increasing demand in the unstable global security environment of today 
and the foreseeable future. However, just as the requirements of direct action 
capabilities have increased, we must also grow specialized indirect action SOF 
capabilities to meet the increasing demand for stabilization operations that will 
in turn prevent violent conflict from occurring in the first place. Attempting 
to train our operators to be experts in both areas potentially wastes precious 
training resources and is counterproductive in light of the diversity of the 
missions. Furthermore, increasing time on station requirements in order to 
grow regional specialists would not coincide with the operational require-
ments of traditional direct action forces/teams. To attempt to mix these two 
distinct tracks would undermine the specialization necessary to perform both 
with the necessary proficiency. 
Thus, specialization towards the FID and SFA missions is a crucial step 
towards enhancing the education and training of SOF. Much of the education 
of SOF operators is already being well accomplished via the robust curriculum 
taught through professional military education. Training, however, must be 
distinguished from education. According to Webster, training is defined as 
the act of teaching “so as to make fit, qualified, or proficient.” 8 Therefore the 
end-goal is to improve our SOF operators’ abilities to work collaboratively 
within a larger country-specific Internal Defense and Development strategy 
to engage with foreign militaries to improve their capabilities to repel exter-
nal enemies and internal subversive elements. In short, the objective is to 
make them more secure and in doing so, increase stability and the chances 
for economic development and growth. This answers the question as to why. 
The harder question at the operational level is how. To answer this question, 
I will attempt to answer the four additional W questions: who, what, when, 
and where.
As postulated earlier in this paper, the who are SOF teams that are special-
ists within the art of FID and SFA; i.e. non-kinetic and with heavy focus on civil 
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affairs. These are personnel who have experience and education working with 
both interagency partners and non-governmental organizations that operate 
within a particular regional focus area. These regional experts have a deep 
understanding of local insurgent movements, their membership, underlying 
causes of instability, history, objectives, claims to legitimacy, and methods 
by which they carry out their campaign. In addition to their comprehensive 
knowledge of the external environment, they understand that FID is an activity 
that at its core is interagency in which the military plays one role of a larger 
group effort. Thus, the military presence as an instrument of power will be 
small M in the DImE construct, with either the DoS or USAID taking the 
lead role. What refers to the capability and subsequent effects that this team 
would be able to provide to the host nation. Arguably, the most effective and 
productive teams are those that work together closely on a day to day basis. 
The ad-hoc methods by which we assemble and employ the interagency team 
supporting specific FID or SFA missions are no longer practical, especially from 
an economic standpoint. Therefore, what we deploy should be interagency 
field teams that have trained together extensively prior to deployment. The 
training should be scenario based and scripted to confront them with the 
most likely challenges they will face over the duration of their time in country. 
Optimally, a train-the-trainer approach could be utilized whereas SOF FID 
and SFA experts could be assigned to country missions where we have targeted 
stabilization operations. Thus after spending considerable time on the ground, 
working with the local NGOs and developing close relationships within the 
embassy and with USAID field personnel, they could then facilitate the train-
ing of the team assembled stateside to deploy for accomplishing the mission.
Duration is one aspect of answering the when question. Experience in 
the region at hand is crucial, as is the continuity and consistency provided 
by a team that remains in place for no less than a 12-month period, unless 
extenuating circumstances or the external environment drastically shift to 
cause an early withdrawal or change in overall strategy by the U.S. While 
some individual supporting members may flow in and out based upon specific 
requirements, such as medical or engineering support, the main cast of team 
members should remain largely fixed for the duration. These modern-day 
legionnaires would be core capabilities that could be reutilized after set force 
reconstitution times to redeploy back into other countries within the same 
region, thereby adding to the regional experience levels and building upon 
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competencies. The desired effects of these kinds of efforts are long-term and 
based upon a root-cause strategy that seeks to alleviate those elements that 
pose risk to stability and security. Lastly, where is to those regions where we 
have targeted stabilization operations that the host nation has requested FID 
and SFA efforts. Every effort should be undertaken to preserve the regional 
integrity of the teams so as to build upon existing education and experience.
In conclusion, the vision advocated in this brief paper seeks to facilitate 
educating and training SOF operators with the FID and SFA skill sets neces-
sary to succeed by increasing specialization of training, encouraging greater 
regional focus, and building cohesive interagency teams. Admittedly, there are 
many operational hurdles to overcome in order to implement this approach. 
While it is easy to espouse that integration and greater levels of collaboration 
amongst all stakeholders are a strategic imperative, the policy changes required 
are significant. Our ability to work though the U.S. diplomatic missions in a 
specific host nation, as well as working in a subordinate role to USAID who 
ultimately has the responsibility for carrying out non-military U.S. foreign 
assistance, per the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, is at an infancy stage. To 
move beyond that infancy and take fuller advantage of an integrated whole-
of-government approach will require removal of barriers, such as funding, 
as well as clear lines of authority between the supporting and supported 
activities. Embedded SOF non-kinetic experts are one way of helping to bridge 
the gap. While we are likely not at the point of being able to bring together 
a national-level mission force that incorporates all of our elements of power, 
we can and should begin to take measures to meld our capabilities together 
towards common goals in those weak and failing states that we anticipate 
contributing to global insecurity in the coming decade. SOF capabilities will 
be an instrumental part of that, particularly the preventative nature of FID 
and SFA that they bring with them. In seeking to reduce the need for U.S. and/
or coalition partners to intervene militarily around the world, increasing our 
fundamental abilities to train personnel to perform this mission promises to 
help alleviate fundamental causes of instability that plague the developing 
nations around the globe. 
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